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I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

This research memorandum analyzes the following issue:
What does an accused have to show to prove he withdrew from a conspiracy?1
This memorandum examines the issue of withdrawal from a conspiracy as it is applied in
international law as well as the domestic laws of several different countries. The concept is not
widely recognized in international law. The issue did arise, however, before the Nuremberg
Tribunal in the case of Rudolf Hess, where the court determined that he was guilty of the
common plan or conspiracy despite his flight to England in 1941 because of his participation in
the preparation and planning of aggressive war before his flight.2
This memorandum also examines the domestic laws of the United States, Great Britain,
Australia and Canada regarding withdrawal from a conspiracy. The courts in all of these
countries have ruled that the accused must take some affirmative action to effectuate withdrawal
from the conspiracy. He must communicate his desire to withdraw from the conspiracy to his
co-conspirators and make an effort to thwart the purpose of the conspiracy.3 Simply fleeing the

1

See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Office of the Prosecutor, Research Topic No. 5, e-mail dated 2
February 2001. The e-mail states that one of the directors of RTLM radio incited genocide in 1993 and continued in
his role as director in 1994 and that RTLM continued to incite genocide in 1994. The accused claims he fled
Rwanda on April 7, 1994 and most of the public incitement occurred after April 7th. The question posed is whether
it matters that most of this director’s involvement with RTLM took place in 1993. What does he have to show to
prove that he withdrew from the conspiracy? The scope of this paper focuses on Ferdinand Nahimana, former
Director of RTLM. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
2

The Trial of German Major War Criminals: Judgment: The Defendants: Hess, available at
http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/judgment/j-defendants-hess.html. [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment]
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
3

The following sources have contributed to this discussion and form the basis for the analysis in this memorandum:
Eldredge v. United States, 62 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1932); Hyde and Schneider v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912);
Mia V. Carpiniello and Abigail Roberts, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 495 (2000); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 5.03 (1) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985); Regina v. Richard Arthur Joyce et al. [1978] 2
W.C.B. 469; Rex v. Whitehouse [1940] 75 C.C.C. 65;R v. Hunter [1991] Crim LR 220; R v. Hoffer [1995] SKQB
QB5494; R v. Whitefield, 79 Cr App Rep 36 (1983); R v. Rook, 97 Cr App Rep 327 (1993); WAYNE R. LAFAVE

1

country would not be sufficient to support a defense of withdrawal from the conspiracy unless
the accused made his intention to abandon the conspiracy clear to his co-conspirators. Therefore,
based on the domestic laws of the United States, Great Britain, Australia and Canada as well as
the Nuremberg Tribunal judgment, a defense of withdrawal from the conspiracy should not
succeed in the Rwandan context.

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Ferdinand Nahimana, former director of Radio des Milles Collines (“RTLM”), is currently
under indictment by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda accused of genocide,
conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide and crimes
against humanity.4 RTLM was used to broadcast messages designed to incite genocide against
the Tutsi population between January 1, 1994 and approximately July 31 1994. Ferdinand
Nahimana was instrumental in the creation and planning of RTLM and knew or had reason to
know of the broadcasts during the time of the public incitement.5 The broadcasts made from
RTLM were responsible for instigating the mass murders of hundreds of thousands of Tutsis. In
its broadcasts, listeners were encouraged to “fill the half-empty graves.”6

AND AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL Law 547-548 (2nd ed. 1986); Regina v. Evans Willie Tietie 1988 NSW Lexis
9399; White v. Ridley (1978) 21 A.L.R. 661.
4

Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No: ICTR 96-11-T, Amended Indictment, 12 July 1999 [hereinafter Indictment].
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
5

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

6

1 VIRGINIA MORRIS AND MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 54-55 (1998).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
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III.

LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO THE CONCEPT OF
WITHDRAWAL FROM A CONSPIRACY

1. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Article 2 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda provides for criminal
liability for “conspiracy to commit genocide.”7 Nahimana has been indicted under this provision
for actions he took as director of Radio des Milles Collines. The purpose of RTLM was to
broadcast messages calculated to accomplish inter-ethnic hatred and encourage people to kill,
persecute and commit acts of violence against the Tutsi population.8 During the time of the
broadcasts, he knew or should have known they were occurring and took no action to prevent
them from being made.9 Therefore, although he was not present during the period of most of the
incitement, he was instrumental in the planning and creation of RTLM and should be liable
under article 2 of the statute.10

2. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

7

Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S/RES/955 (1994) (Annex), 8 November 1994, cited in 2
Virginia Morris and Michael P. Scharf, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 5 (1998)
[hereinafter ICTR Statute]. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3].
8

Indictment, supra note 4. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

9

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

10

ICTR Statute, supra note 7. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3].

3

A proposed Definition of Offenses, interpreting the elements of the crimes authorized by
Articles 2 through 5 of the Statute of the International Tribunal, was drafted in February 1994.11
It was intended to serve as an official submission of the United States to the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia after interagency coordination and approval by the
Department of State. Although the proposed Definition of Offenses was never formally
submitted by the United States, it has been used extensively by an American Bar Association
Task Force on War Crimes, the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations ad hoc Committee for an
International Criminal Court and the Office of the Prosecutor for the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.12
Section 1.3 of the proposed Definition of Offenses discusses the concept of conspiracy.13
There are two elements of conspiracy under this section. The first element is “that the accused
entered into an agreement with one or more persons to commit an offense proscribed by
international law and under the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal,” and the second is
“that, while the agreement continued to exist, and while the accused remained a party to the
agreement, the accused or at least one of the co-conspirators performed an overt act for the
purpose of bringing about the object of the conspiracy.”14 This section also provides for a
defense of withdrawal from the conspiracy. If a party to the conspiracy abandons or withdraws
from the agreement to commit the offense before the commission of an overt act by any
conspirator, he will not be guilty of conspiracy. For the defense to be effective, the withdrawal

11

Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., Article, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Defining the
Offenses, 23 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 15 (1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12].

12

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12].

13

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12].

14

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
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or abandonment must consist of affirmative conduct which is wholly inconsistent with adherence
to the unlawful agreement and which shows that the party has severed all connection with the
conspiracy.15 This provision requires the accused to do more to prove withdrawal than merely
physically removing himself from the scene. He must take affirmative action that is inconsistent
with the common plan and sever all ties with the co-conspirators. The accused must also
withdraw before an overt act occurs. In the case of Nahimana, several overt acts had already
occurred before the time he fled the country. He had already created the radio station, along with
his co-conspirators, and had been involved in the broadcasts inciting the public to commit
genocide. Even if his actions in fleeing the country were enough to be considered an effective
withdrawal from the conspiracy, it was too late. Since the overt acts were already taken before
his flight, he should remain liable for the conspiracy charge.

3. Nuremberg Tribunal
The only international judicial precedent on the question of withdrawal from a conspiracy
was the case of Rudolf Hess, who had been indicted by the Nuremberg Tribunal under all four
counts – the common plan or conspiracy, crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against
humanity.16 He joined the Nazi Party in 1920 and became Hitler’s closest confidant during their
imprisonment together in the Landsberg fortress in 1924. He rose through the ranks of the Party
and was appointed Deputy to the Fuehrer. Hitler announced Hess as his successor designate
after Goering in 1939.17 Hess flew from Germany to Scotland on May 10th, 1941.18

15

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12].

16

Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 2. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

17

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

5

The first argument advanced by Hess’s defense counsel was that the common plan or
conspiracy did not even exist in the first place.19 However, if the court decided to accept the
existence of the common plan, then Hess’s liability should be limited to acts occurring before
May 10th, 1941.20 Hess’s counsel acknowledged that there were no provisions in the Nuremberg
Charter as to whether a withdrawal from the common plan was possible, but argued that the
possibility existed under the principles of Continental European law. Under Continental law, the
responsibility of an accused extends only as far as his actions or omissions are controlled by his
will.21 The Anglo-American concept of conspiracy was not recognized in continental Europe at
that time.22 In Hess’s case, his attorney argued, any developments that occurred after his flight
to England could not have been controlled by his will.23
The Tribunal rejected this argument, convicting Hess of the common plan or conspiracy
and crimes against peace.24 The Tribunal found the following critical to Hess’s criminal liability
for conspiracy: In his position as Deputy to the Fuehrer, Hess had responsibility for handling all
matters relating to the Nazi Party and had authority to make decisions in Hitler’s name on
questions regarding Party leadership. Until his flight to England, he was Hitler’s closest personal
confidant and must have been aware of Hitler’s aggressive plans when they came into

18

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

19

19 International Military Tribunal, Trial of German Major War Criminals 379 [1946] available at
http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-19/tgmwc-19-186-09.shtml. [hereinafter International Military
Tribunal]. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 15].

20

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 15].

21

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 15].

22

MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE 12 (1997). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 16].

23

International Military Tribunal, supra note 19. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 15].

24

Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 2 at 88. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
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existence.25 He also had authority through his position as Reichs Minister without Portfolio to
approve all legislation suggested by Reichs Ministers before it could become law. Hess actively
supported preparations for war in this position.26
Although the Tribunal convicted Hess of conspiracy and crimes against peace, it found
Hess not guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity.27 The Tribunal acknowledged that
there was evidence showing the participation of the Party Chancellery, under Hess, in the giving
out of orders connected with the commission of war crimes and that Hess may have had
knowledge of the crimes that were being committed, even if he did not participate in them.
There was also evidence that Hess signed decrees forcing groups of Poles to accept German
citizenship. However, the Tribunal did not believe that the evidence was sufficient to connect
Hess with particular war crimes to sustain a finding of guilt.28
Although the majority of the Tribunal found Hess not guilty of crimes against humanity,
the Soviet Judge took a different view.29 In the dissenting opinion, the Soviet Judge found that
Hess’s actions up to his flight to England supported a finding of guilt on the charge of crimes
against humanity. Even though Hess did not take a direct part in the planning and commission of
crimes occurring after his flight to England, he did everything possible in preparing for these
crimes.30 He, along with Himmler, created the SS police organizations that committed the most

25

Id. at 87. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

26

Id. at 86. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

27

Id. at 88. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

28

Id. at 87. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

29

International Military Tribunal, Trial of Major German War Criminals 141 [1946] available at
http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/judgment/j-dissenting-hess.html. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 13].

30

Id. at 141. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13].

7

merciless crimes against humanity.31 Hess issued an ordinance in 1935 under the Reich
citizenship law that denied Jews the right to vote in elections or hold public office.32 He also
initiated the formation of special “penal laws” for Poles and Jews in occupied Eastern territories.
The Soviet Judge found that based on these actions “there can be no doubt that Hess together
with the other major war criminals is guilty of crimes against humanity” and recommended a
sentence of death.33
In the present case, although Nahimana fled the country around the time of most of the public
incitement, as director of RTLM, he was an active participant in the planning and creation of the
station and its broadcasts. From 1990 until 1994, he conspired with others to formulate a plan
with the intent to exterminate the Tutsi population and the moderate Hutus.34 The plan consisted
of the broadcasting of messages of ethnic hatred and incitement to violence, the training and
distribution of weapons to militiamen, and the preparation of lists of people to be eliminated and
the broadcasting of their identities.35 Drawing from the analysis of the Nuremberg Tribunal in
the Hess case, the Tribunal should not recognize withdrawal from the conspiracy as a legitimate
defense.

B. DOMESTIC APPROACHES TO THE CONCEPT OF WITHDRAWAL
FROM A CONSPIRACY

31

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13].

32

Id. at 142. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13].

33

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13].

34

Indictment, supra note 4. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

35

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

8

The concept of withdrawal from a conspiracy is recognized under the common law systems
of the United States, Great Britain, Australia and Canada, among others. The laws of each of
these countries require more from an accused than merely physically removing himself from the
scene to effectively withdraw from a conspiracy. This section demonstrates why, under the laws
of each of the above countries, the concept of withdrawal from a conspiracy would not be a
legitimate defense in the case of Nahimana.

1. United States
The crime of conspiracy is outlined in the Model Penal Code.36 The most important element
of the crime is the agreement to commit an unlawful act. Most states also have a requirement
that an overt act performed in furtherance of the plan be proven.37 Some states require that this
overt act be a substantial step toward the commission of the crime.38 The overt act itself does not
need to be criminal or unlawful.39 Under common law, there are four elements to a conspiracy:
“(1) an agreement between at least two parties (2) to achieve an illegal goal (3) with knowledge
of the conspiracy and with actual participation in the conspiracy, and (4) at least one conspirator
commits an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.”40

36

MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 (1) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 8]. Section 5.03 defines conspiracy as: “A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or
persons to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he: (a) agrees with such
other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct that constitutes such crime or an
attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or (b) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or
commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.”
37

WAYNE R. LAFAVE AND AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 547-548 (2nd ed. 1986). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 20].
38

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 20].

39

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 20].

40

Keri C. McGrath and Jennifer L. Pfeiffer, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 661 (1999)
[hereinafter Federal Criminal Conspiracy]. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11].

9

According to the Model Penal Code, it is an affirmative defense if the actor thwarts the goal
of the conspiracy by a complete and voluntary renunciation of the criminal purpose.41 If an actor
abandons the agreement, the conspiracy is terminated as to him only if he informs his coconspirators of his withdrawal or he informs the law enforcement authorities of the existence of
the conspiracy and of his participation in the conspiracy.42 An effective withdrawal requires
more than mere cessation of activity. The conspirator must commit “affirmative acts
inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy and communicate them in a manner reasonably
calculated to reach co-conspirators.”43 Further, the conspirator must unequivocally withdraw
before any overt act has been committed in order to escape liability.44
The defense of withdrawal from a conspiracy has traditionally been treated as an affirmative
defense and the burden of proving the withdrawal generally rests on the defendant.45
Withdrawal, by itself, serves only as a partial defense. A defendant will not be relieved of all
liability for the conspiracy or for crimes he committed in furtherance of the conspiracy prior to
his withdrawal, but he will be exonerated for crimes committed subsequent to his withdrawal.46
There are two situations in which withdrawal may operate as a complete defense. The first is
when the withdrawal occurs before an overt act has been committed, and the second is when the

41

MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 (6) (Official

Draft and Revised Comments 1985). [Reproduced in the accompanying

notebook at Tab 8].
42

MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 (7) (c) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 8].
43

Mia V. Carpiniello and Abigail Roberts, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 495, 514 (2000).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9].

44

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8].

45

Linda Cantoni, Note, Withdrawal from a Conspiracy: A Constitutional Allocation of Evidentiary Burdens, 51
FORDHAM L. REV. 438, 439 (1982). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10].

46

Id. at 441. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
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withdrawal is coupled with the statute of limitations.47 The statute of limitations begins to run
from the time of the withdrawal from the conspiracy.48
The concept of withdrawal from a conspiracy has long been recognized at common law. The
leading case on this issue is Eldredge v. United States.49 This case has been cited by courts in
several common law countries. In this case, Eldredge and three of his fellow employees were
involved in embezzling funds from the bank where they were employed and falsifying the books.
Eldredge left his job at the bank after a couple of years, but continued to participate in the
conspiracy. He later took a job as a bookkeeper with a building and loan company. He only
ended his participation when he was promoted in his new position and was unable to continue
falsifying statements.50 He informed his co-conspirators that he would no longer be able to
participate and would have nothing further to do with covering up the shortage at the bank.
When the shortage was discovered and Eldredge was indicted, he claimed that he had withdrawn
from the conspiracy.51
The court found that although Eldredge removed himself from the conspiracy, he did not
intend to withdraw his assent to the continued concealment of the shortages by his coconspirators. A withdrawal cannot be effective by intent alone. There must also be some
affirmative action taken.52 In the court’s frequently quoted words, “a declared intent to withdraw
from a conspiracy to dynamite a building is not enough, if the fuse has been set; he must step on

47

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10].

48

Federal Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 40, at 680. [Reproduced at Tab 11].

49

Eldredge v. United States, 62 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1932). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab21].

50

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21].

51

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21].

52

Id. at 451. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21].

11

the fuse.”53 The court held that the actions Eldredge took were insufficient to effectively
withdraw from the conspiracy and he was still liable for the crime.54
In the case of Hyde and Schneider v. United States, a case where the defendants were
convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States, Schneider claimed that he should not be
liable because he had not committed any overt acts during the three year statute of limitations
and had previously made a partial disclosure of the conspiracy to the government.55 The court
determined that although he did not take any action in furtherance of the conspiracy during that
period, he “remained acquiescent, expecting and understanding” that additional acts should be
performed and that he might be playing his part by keeping still as much as he did by his
previous actions.56 The court stated, “as he has started evil forces he must withdraw his support
from them or incur the guilt of their continuance.”57 This idea was reaffirmed in Loser v.
Superior Court.58 The court in this case declared “some affirmative act bringing home the
withdrawal to the knowledge of his confederates is necessary, otherwise the conspiracy once
established will be presumed to continue until the ends are accomplished or its abandonment
established.”59

53

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21].

54

Id. at 452. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21].

55

Hyde and Schneider v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 368 (1912). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 22].

56

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 22].

57

Id. at 369-370. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 22].

58

Julius Loser v. The Superior Court of Alameda County, 78 Cal. App. 2d 30 (1947). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 23].

59

Id. at 32. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23].

12

The concept of withdrawal from a conspiracy is also addressed in United States military law.
The elements of the crime of conspiracy are basically the same as under American common
law.60 The requirements for an effective withdrawal are also the same as those provided by
common law. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) provides:
A party to the conspiracy who abandons or withdraws from the agreement
to commit the offense before the commission of an overt act by any
conspirator is not guilty of conspiracy. An effective withdrawal or
abandonment must consist of affirmative conduct which is wholly
inconsistent with adherence to the unlawful agreement and which shows
that the party has severed all connection with the conspiracy. A
conspirator who effectively abandons or withdraws from the conspiracy
after the performance of an overt act by one of the conspirators remains
guilty of conspiracy and of any offenses committed pursuant to the
conspiracy up to the time of the abandonment or withdrawal. However, a
person who has abandoned or withdrawn from the conspiracy is not liable
for offenses committed thereafter by the remaining conspirators. The
withdrawal of a conspirator from the conspiracy does not affect the status
of the remaining members.61
The affirmative act is the essential element in the defense of withdrawal from the conspiracy
under both the common law and UCMJ. Without taking some affirmative action sufficient to
give notice of the intent to withdraw, a defendant has not effectively withdrawn and will remain
liable for the conspiracy.

2. Great Britain
The laws of Great Britain regarding conspiracy are similar to the laws of the United States.
Conspiracy is defined as: “(a) it is a statutory offence to agree with any other person or person

60

PUNITIVE ARTICLES OF THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE Art. 81 § 4.5.2 b available at
http://www.military.about.com/careers/usmilitary/library/milinfo/mcm/bl81.htm. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 7]. The elements of conspiracy are: “(1) that the accused entered into an agreement with one or
more person to commit an offense under the code; and (2) that, while the agreement continued to exist, and while
the accused remained a party to the agreement, the accused or at least one of the co-conspirators performed an overt
act for the purpose of bringing about the object of the conspiracy.
61

Id. at § 4.5.3 c.(6). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7].

13

for the commission of an offence or offences,” and “(b) it is a common law offence to agree with
any person or persons to defraud or, possibly, to corrupt public morals or to outrage public
decency.”62 The agreement is the gist of the crime of conspiracy. There cannot be a conspiracy
unless there has been a concluded agreement.63 Once the parties agree to the plan, the offense is
complete and it makes no difference if they never put the plan into action.64 A defendant who
has incited a crime can generally escape liability if he expressly and clearly countermands the
crime or withdraws his assent before the crime is committed as long as he has done no more than
encouraging or inciting the commission of the crime.65 He will still remain liable for any
previous incitement or conspiracy charges, as inchoate offenses. He can likely also avoid
liability by going to the police and confessing his part in the conspiracy or warning the intended
victim in time to stop the crime from occurring.66
This premise was applied in the case of R v. Whitefield.67 The court stated that if a person has
counseled someone else to commit a crime, he may be able to escape liability by withdrawing
before the crime has been committed.68 However, “it is not sufficient that he should merely
repent or change his mind. If his participation is confined to advice or encouragement, he must
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at least communicate his change of mind to the other.”69 If the accused has taken positive steps
in assisting the crime, he must do everything possible to prevent the commission of the crime in
order to effectively withdraw from the conspiracy.70
In the case of R v. Rook, the appellant agreed with three other men to carry out a contract
killing on another man’s wife.71 The four men met to make plans for the murder, but the
appellant did not meet the other two on the day of the killing as arranged and the other men
carried out the killing. He never gave any indication to his co-defendants that he would not be
present at the murder. His defense was that he never intended to carry out the murder and that he
thought the other two men would not go through with it if he were not there.72 He said he was
merely hoping to get some money in advance from the intended victim’s husband and then
disappear.73 The court stated that one essential element must be established to avoid liability in
this type of case: “where practicable and reasonable there must be timely communication of the
intention to abandon the common purpose from those who wish to disassociate themselves from
the contemplated crime to those who desire to continue in it.”74 What constitutes timely
communication is determined by the facts of each individual case but the communication needs
to “serve unequivocal notice upon the other party to the common unlawful cause that if he
proceeds upon it he does so without the further aid and assistance of those who withdraw.”75
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The court held that although the appellant intended to withdraw from the conspiracy, he never
communicated his intention to the other members of the conspiracy, so the minimum necessary
for withdrawal was not established.

76

3. Australia
The concept of conspiracy in Australia is quite similar to that of the United States. Under the
Australian Criminal Code Act (“the Code”), the elements of conspiracy are: “(a) the person must
have entered into an agreement with one or more other persons; and (b) must have intended that
an offence would be committed pursuant to the agreement; and (c) the person or at least one
other party to the agreement must have committed an overt act pursuant to the agreement.”77
The Code provides for a defense of withdrawal from the conspiracy before an overt act has been
committed if the person “(a) withdrew from the agreement; and (b) took all reasonable steps to
prevent the commission of the offence.”78 The trial judge in the case of Collins and Others v. R
explained the law as it applies to the common plan.79 If two or more people come to an
agreement that they will commit a crime together and then at least one of them commits the act
to which they agreed, they are all equally guilty of the crime regardless of each person’s role in
the crime.80 The judge in this case also emphasized that the burden in a case of withdrawal rests
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on the prosecution to prove the existence of the common plan and that the defendant was a
member of the conspiracy through the commission of the crime in question.81
In the case of White v. Ridley, the defendant used an innocent agent, an airline, to airfreight a
box containing cannabis from Singapore to Australia.82 He used a false name to ship the box to a
fictitious person in Australia. He traveled to Australia ahead of the box and then tried to stop the
box from being shipped, after the consignment note was found during a Customs search, but the
airline shipped the box anyway. The defendant was convicted of importation of prohibited
goods.83 The question raised before the court was whether he had effectively countermanded the
commission of the crime. The court stated that it is not unreasonable “to insist that a person who
has counseled or procured another to commit a crime, or has conspired with others to commit a
crime, should accompany his countermand or withdrawal with such action as he can reasonably
take to undo the effect of his previous encouragement or participation.”84 The accused must
have accompanied the countermand with words or conduct that made it clear to the agent that the
accused no longer wanted the agent to perform the action previously requested. The accused
must have done as much as was reasonably possible to counteract his earlier request. “The
countermand will not have been timely if it was given when it was too late to stop the train of
events which was started by his request.”85
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The case of Regina v. Tietie86 followed the reasoning of White v. Ridley.87 The appellant,
along with two other men, was involved in the beating death of another man. He claimed that he
hit and kicked the victim until he thought the victim had had enough and then ran away, calling
to the others to stop also.88 The question raised was whether the appellant had effectively
withdrawn by running away. The trial judge stated:
To effectively withdraw from a common enterprise upon which he has
embarked he must withdraw completely. It must be timely. He must
make it known to the others that he was withdrawing and he must, by such
act and words as may be appropriate, do what he reasonably can to
dissuade the others from continuing with the unlawful purpose.89
The trial judge went on to say that if an accused has encouraged another to commit a crime by
his presence and actions, then he should accompany his withdrawal and countermand with
whatever action he can reasonably take to undo the effect of his previous encouragement and
participation to escape further criminal liability.90 The Supreme Court of New South Wales
upheld this ruling.91
In the case of The Queen v. Coombes, the appellant was convicted of murder.92 He and a coconspirator, Conlan, took the victim aboard a boat with the intention of assaulting him because
of an alleged sexual assault on Conlan’s sister. The appellant participated in the beating of the
victim. When Conlan pulled out a knife to stab the victim, the appellant claimed he screamed at
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Conlan to stop and tried to push the victim out of the way of the knife.93 Conlan then pushed the
victim overboard and stabbed him again when he was reaching up for help back into the boat.
The appellant claimed that he again screamed at Conlan to stop.94 The appellant’s ex-wife
contradicted his claims with her testimony that he told her he and Conlan hit the victim a couple
of times and they threw him overboard. They then ran over him with the propeller and cut him
up so that the fish would finish him off, according to her testimony.95
In his instructions to the jury, the trial judge directed them as to the requirements for
withdrawing from a planned crime if they believed the appellant’s version of the events. He
stated that it was insufficient “to feel qualms or wish to stop the plan being put into action.”96 He
said, “There must be action taken and that action must be such as may reasonably be taken to
undo the effect of the previous participation.”97 The jury found that the appellant had not
effectively withdrawn from the planned crime and convicted him of murder. On appeal, the
court upheld the trial judge’s jury instruction and the appellant’s conviction.98

4. Canada
The concept of withdrawal from a conspiracy in Canada is a common law principle. The
statutory guidelines in the Criminal Code as to conspiracy in murder cases are: “every one who
conspires with any one to commit murder or to cause another person to be murdered, whether in
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Canada or not, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to a maximum term of imprisonment
for life.”99 Under § 21.1, the law as to the common intention states that anyone is a party to an
offense if he “(a) actually commits it; (b) does or omits to do anything for the purpose of aiding
any person to commit it; (c) abets any person in committing it.”100 The basic premise as to
withdrawal is where several persons join in a common plan to commit a crime and participate in
the acts leading up to the crime, the fact that some of the members change their minds and leave
the scene before the crime is actually committed does not constitute a withdrawal from the
conspiracy to relieve them from liability. There must also be a timely communication to the
other members of the conspiracy of the intent to withdraw or abandon the common plan.101 The
court in Rex v. Whitehouse stated that,
After a crime has been committed and before a prior abandonment of the
common enterprise may be found by a jury there must be … in the
absence of exceptional circumstances, something more than a mere mental
change of intention and physical change of place by those associates who
wish to dissociate themselves from the consequences attendant upon their
willing assistance up to the moment of the actual commission of that
crime.102
The essential element of the withdrawal is the timely communication, where practicable and
reasonable, of the intention to abandon the common purpose. The communication must be such
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that it serves unequivocal notice upon the other party to the conspiracy that if he proceeds upon
the unlawful purpose, he does so without any further assistance from those who withdraw.103
In the case of Regina v. Joyce et al, the appellants were part of a conspiracy to rob two stores
simultaneously.104 The appellants were to rob one store in Vancouver while the other two
members were to rob another store in Burnaby to confuse the police. At the appointed time, the
appellants decided not to rob the store in Vancouver because too many employees were
present.105 The other robbery took place anyway and an employee was shot and killed. The
appellants claimed they had withdrawn from the conspiracy by deciding not to go through with
the robbery of the store in Vancouver.106 The evidence showed that throughout the planning of
the scheme, the conspirators recognized that it might be impossible to rob one or the other of the
two stores. Therefore, even when they decided to abandon the Vancouver robbery, they did not
withdraw from the common plan.107 Moreover, even if they did plan to withdraw from the
scheme, they failed to communicate the withdrawal to the co-conspirators. The court found that
a communication may have had a significant impact. If the co-conspirators had known that the
appellants were not going to fulfill their part, they might have abandoned their own part of the
scheme.108 The court drew on the logic in Rex v. Whitehouse109 and stated that timely
communication to serve unequivocal notice of the withdrawal on the co-conspirators is an
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essential element of the defense of withdrawal.110 Since they did not communicate their intent to
withdraw to the co-conspirators, the appellants did not effectively withdraw from the
conspiracy.111
Even if an accused is able to prove that he effectively withdrew from a conspiracy to be
relieved from liability for the underlying offense, he may still be found guilty of the conspiracy
charge.112 As the court in R v. Hoffer stated, the agreement is the most important of the
conspiracy. The court, citing numerous sources, said that the agreement is the gist of the charge
of conspiracy and that a person’s participation in a conspiracy may consist of nothing more than
coming to an agreement with another party that a crime be committed.113 The important question
is not what acts were taken in furtherance of the conspiracy, but whether there was a common
agreement to carry out a crime in which all of the co-conspirators were involved. The court went
on to say that a person may be guilty of a conspiracy by merely assenting to the common design
even though no action may have been intended to be taken by him personally.114
The laws of the United States, Great Britain, Australia and Canada all require a defendant to
take some action in order to effectively withdraw from a conspiracy. A mere change of heart or
physical withdrawal from the scene would not be enough under the laws of any of these
countries. The withdrawal must be accompanied by a communication to the co-conspirators
sufficient to put them on notice that the party withdrawing no longer desires to participate in the
common plan. In the present case, absent evidence showing that he communicated his desire to
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withdraw or took steps to try to thwart the common plan, the defendant did not effectively
withdraw and the Tribunal should not accept withdrawal from the conspiracy as a legitimate
defense.
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